The game theory analysis of homestead use right circulation income distribution under the context of the separation of three powers

Abstract

Reasonable distribution of income from the circulation of homestead is the foundation for revitalizing idle rural homesteads. This study constructs a game relationship among villagers, village collectives, and intended parties, with the help of game theory, and discusses the issues about generation logic of circulation income distribution, the bargaining power and so on. It reveals the reasons and conditions for emergence of income distribution, appropriate way of distribution, and the mechanism by which bargaining power affects income distribution. It fills the theoretical gap regarding the generation mechanism and bargaining power of income distribution from homestead land use rights circulation, and lays the groundwork for bridging the ideal and the real about income distribution. The study’s findings indicate that under certain conditions, villagers will choose to share part of the income with the village collective in exchange for the investment in village construction. And compared to income sharing based on circulation price, it based on the area of homestead land is more easily implemented. In addition, the bargaining power of villagers and the village collective determines the result of income distribution, which is closely related to factors such as their negotiation costs and rules. In the process of revitalizing homestead land, it is essential to respect the wishes and rights of villagers, guide cooperation between villagers and village collectives, and reasonably distribute the surplus from cooperation. Additionally, it is necessary to establish reasonable policy rules to prevent distortions in income distribution due to differences in bargaining power.