Should manufacturers choose technological innovation in dual-channel supply chains during emergencies?

Abstract

This study investigates pricing and coordination strategies for a dual-channel supply chain (DCSC), considering technological innovations in emergencies. We have established the DCSC model consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and an E-commerce platform (ECP). Whether manufacturers choose to invest in technological innovation during emergencies can be divided into traditional production mode and technological innovation mode. Using the reverse induction method to solve the Stackelberg game problem, explore the pricing and channel selection strategies of each member in a DCSC under different modes. In addition, a revenue-sharing contract for a DCSC under emergencies was designed and improved. Research has shown that under emergencies, consumers’ technological innovation preference can increase the profits of each member in the DCSC and manufacturers’ technological innovation level. Manufacturers are more willing to choose technological innovation mode rather than traditional production mode. However, an increase in the commission rate of ECP can hinder the level of technological innovation of manufacturers and affect the issue of choosing between offline channel and ECP channel. Specifically, when the commission rate exceeds a certain threshold, the offline channel should be chosen. Finally, traditional revenue-sharing contracts fail to effectively coordinate DCSC that incorporate technological innovation during emergencies. To address this limitation, an improved revenue-sharing contract is proposed, which enhances the level of technological innovation while achieving Pareto improvements within the DCSC.