Failing Banks

S Sergio Correia (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ,) S Stephan Luck (Federal Reserve Bank of New York ,) E Emil Verner (MIT Sloan School of Management ,)

Abstract

Abstract Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of non-fundamental runs. Furthermore, low recovery rates on failed banks’ assets suggest that most failed banks subject to runs were fundamentally insolvent, barring large value destruction of receiverships. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the primary cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals.

Article Details

Volume / Issue Vol. 141, Issue 1
Published January 14, 2026
Pages 147-204
ISSN 0033-5533
Publisher Oxford University Press (OUP)

Authors (3)

S

Sergio Correia

Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ,

S

Stephan Luck

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ,

E

Emil Verner

MIT Sloan School of Management ,