Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language

H Hope Kean (Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) A Alexander Fung (Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) P Paris Jaggers (Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London) J Jason Chen J Joshua S. Rule (Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Y Yael Benn (School of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University) J Joshua B. Tenenbaum S Steven T. Piantadosi (Department of Psychology, University of California) R Rosemary A. Varley (Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London) E Evelina Fedorenko (Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Humans are endowed with a powerful capacity for inductive and deductive logical thought: we easily form generalizations based on a few examples and draw conclusions from known premises. Humans also arguably have the most sophisticated communication system in the animal kingdom: natural language allows us to express complex and structured meanings. Some have therefore argued for a tight relationship between complex thought and language, postulating that reasoning, including logical reasoning, relies on linguistic representations. We systematically investigated the relationship between logical reasoning and language using two complementary approaches. First, we used noninvasive brain imaging (fMRI) to examine neural activity as healthy adults engaged in logical reasoning tasks. And second, we behaviorally evaluated logical abilities in individuals with extensive lesions to the language brain areas and consequent severe linguistic impairment. Our findings reveal that the language brain network is not engaged during logical reasoning, and patients with severe aphasia exhibit intact performance on logic tasks. Instead, inductive reasoning recruits the domain-general multiple demand network implicated broadly in goal-directed behaviors, whereas deductive reasoning draws on brain regions that are distinct from both the language and the multiple demand networks. Together, these results indicate that linguistic representations are neither utilized nor required for inductive or deductive logical reasoning.

Article Details

Volume / Issue Vol. 123, Issue 28
Published July 14, 2026
ISSN 0027-8424
Publisher National Academy of Sciences

Authors (10)

H

Hope Kean

Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

A

Alexander Fung

Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

P

Paris Jaggers

Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London

J

Jason Chen

J

Joshua S. Rule

Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Y

Yael Benn

School of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University

J

Joshua B. Tenenbaum

S

Steven T. Piantadosi

Department of Psychology, University of California

R

Rosemary A. Varley

Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London

E

Evelina Fedorenko

Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology