Evidence from formal logical reasoning reveals that the language of thought is not natural language
Abstract
Humans are endowed with a powerful capacity for inductive and deductive logical thought: we easily form generalizations based on a few examples and draw conclusions from known premises. Humans also arguably have the most sophisticated communication system in the animal kingdom: natural language allows us to express complex and structured meanings. Some have therefore argued for a tight relationship between complex thought and language, postulating that reasoning, including logical reasoning, relies on linguistic representations. We systematically investigated the relationship between logical reasoning and language using two complementary approaches. First, we used noninvasive brain imaging (fMRI) to examine neural activity as healthy adults engaged in logical reasoning tasks. And second, we behaviorally evaluated logical abilities in individuals with extensive lesions to the language brain areas and consequent severe linguistic impairment. Our findings reveal that the language brain network is not engaged during logical reasoning, and patients with severe aphasia exhibit intact performance on logic tasks. Instead, inductive reasoning recruits the domain-general multiple demand network implicated broadly in goal-directed behaviors, whereas deductive reasoning draws on brain regions that are distinct from both the language and the multiple demand networks. Together, these results indicate that linguistic representations are neither utilized nor required for inductive or deductive logical reasoning.
Article Details
Journal Info
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
National Academy of Sciences
Authors (10)
Hope Kean
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Alexander Fung
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Paris Jaggers
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
Jason Chen
Joshua S. Rule
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Yael Benn
School of Psychology, Manchester Metropolitan University
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
Steven T. Piantadosi
Department of Psychology, University of California
Rosemary A. Varley
Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College London
Evelina Fedorenko
Brain and Cognitive Sciences Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology