Diffusion-induced instabilities promote cooperation in eco-evolutionary networks

Abstract

Understanding how cooperation persists despite the advantage of selfish behavior remains a central challenge in evolutionary dynamics. Classical models of public goods dilemmas predict dominance of defectors, yet natural and social systems often sustain cooperation. We study an eco-evolutionary public goods game on complex networks where cooperators and defectors diffuse at different rates. When the isolated system is in a defector-dominated coexistence regime, faster dispersal of defectors than cooperators leads to a symmetry-breaking transition that produces localized clusters of cooperators. In heterogeneous networks, nodes with higher connectivity become significantly more likely to exhibit cooperative dominance. A degree-based mean-field reduction supports this result by showing that network connectivity controls an effective coupling strength proportional to node degree, thereby producing a bifurcation that separates defector-dominated and cooperative states. We also address why not all hubs become cooperative by means of a multistability analysis. These results reveal how asymmetric mobility and heterogeneous connectivity jointly promote cooperation in structured populations.