Behavioral nudges prevent loan delinquencies at scale: A 13-million-person field experiment

R Robert Kuan (Department of Operations, Information and Decisions, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) K Kristin Blagg (Center on Education Data and Policy, The Urban Institute) B Benjamin L. Castleman (The Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia) R Rajeev Darolia (Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of Education) J Jordan D. Matsudaira (Department of Public Administration and Policy, The School of Public Affairs, American University) K Katherine L. Milkman (Department of Operations, Information and Decisions, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) L Lesley J. Turner (The Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago)

Abstract

Americans collectively hold over $1.6 trillion in student loan debt, and over the last decade millions of borrowers have defaulted on loans, with serious consequences for their financial health. In a 13-million-person field experiment with the U.S. Department of Education, we tested the effectiveness of different email interventions to inform borrowers about alternative repayment options after a missed loan payment. Our interventions tested whether sending monthly behaviorally-informed emails, providing follow-up reminders, framing benefits in percentage (vs. dollar) terms, and providing just one recommended action step at a time (vs. two) affected borrower outcomes. We find that i) behaviorally-informed emails reduce estimated 60-d delinquencies by 0.42 pp, ii) reminders boost the efficacy of such emails by 0.57 pp, iii) describing potential savings in percentage terms is more effective than describing these benefits in dollar terms, reducing estimated delinquencies by 0.14 pp, and iv) encouraging two actions (i.e., enrollment in income-driven repayment plans and auto debit programs) repeatedly across two emails is marginally more effective than encouraging one action at-a-time across two emails, reducing estimated delinquencies by 0.05 pp. Overall, if scaled to all 13-million borrowers in our experiment, we estimate that our best-performing intervention would have averted approximately 79,800 60-d delinquencies. Our findings i) highlight the benefits of describing potential savings in percentage terms, which may magnify perceived savings for recipients, ii) underscore the risks of oversimplification, and iii) demonstrate that nudges can be an effective, low-cost complement to other policies for reducing delinquencies and supporting borrowers with student loan debt.

Article Details

Volume / Issue Vol. 122, Issue 4
Published January 28, 2025
ISSN 0027-8424
Publisher National Academy of Sciences

Authors (7)

R

Robert Kuan

Department of Operations, Information and Decisions, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

K

Kristin Blagg

Center on Education Data and Policy, The Urban Institute

B

Benjamin L. Castleman

The Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, University of Virginia

R

Rajeev Darolia

Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of Education

J

Jordan D. Matsudaira

Department of Public Administration and Policy, The School of Public Affairs, American University

K

Katherine L. Milkman

Department of Operations, Information and Decisions, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

L

Lesley J. Turner

The Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago